Image may be NSFW.
Clik here to view.
In my last post, Sam Harris on Divine Commands: Part I, I criticised Sam Harris’ characterisation of divine command meta-ethics. In this post I want to turn to his second line of criticism of a Divine Command Theory. In Harris’ debate with William Lane Craig at Notre Dame, transcript here, Harris stated:
“I’m glad he raised the issue of psychopathy—we are being offered a psychopathic and psychotic moral attitude. It’s psychotic because this is completely delusional. There’s no reason to believe that we live in a universe ruled by an invisible monster Yahweh. But it is, it is psychopathic because this is a total detachment from the, from the well-being of human beings. It, this so easily rationalizes the slaughter of children. Ok, just think about the Muslims at this moment who are blowing themselves up, convinced that they are agents of God’s will. There is absolutely nothing that Dr. Craig can s—can say against their behavior, in moral terms, apart from his own faith-based claim that they’re praying to the wrong God. If they had the right God, what they were doing would be good, on Divine Command theory.”
Here, Harris suggests a Divine Command Theory expresses both a psychopathic and a psychotic moral attitude. I will address the charge of a Divine Command Theory being “psychotic” in a later post. Here, I want to address what I think is Harris’ main concern: a Divine Command Theory is psychopathic. It involves a “total detachment … from the well-being of human beings” and “so easily rationalizes the slaughter of children”. Why does Harris think this? “Because, at this moment Islamic terrorists are blowing themselves up convinced they are agents of God’s will, and a divine command theory can say nothing against their behavior in moral terms except the faith based claim that they are praying to the wrong God.”
A lot could be said about this argument. First, note that even if it were sound, it does not show the Divine Command Theory is false. Harris is, in fact, offering pragmatic arguments against the theory: it is dangerous, or is easily misused – but there are many things which are dangerous and easily misused that are nevertheless true.
More importantly, the argument is unsound. A Divine Command Theory contends that an action is obligatory if God actually commands that action. It does not contend that an action is obligatory if someone claims, or believes that God commands it. Obviously, simply believing something is the case does not mean that it is true. Harris, as an atheist, surely recognises this; many people believe and are convinced God exists yet Harris thinks they are mistaken.
Hence, the mere fact an Islamic terrorist believes God has commanded him or her to “blow themselves up” does not commit the divine command theorist to supporting terrorism. All a divine command theorist needs to say in response to Islamic terrorists is that God did not command them to engage in terrorism. This is not the same as claiming “they are praying to the wrong God”. It is quite possible they are praying to the right God yet they are also violating his commands.
Praying to God does not mean one is obeying him.Many religious believers with earnest prayer lives candidly admit that they fail to perfectly obey God. Moreover, if a Divine Command Theory is correct then every person, theist or atheist, who refrains from murder, rape, or theft is obeying God’s commands. It does not follow they are praying to any God. Harris here seems to presuppose a caricature of a Divine Command Theory whereby it affirms that an action is right if it is done by someone who prays to the right God. No divine command theorist I know of, and certainly not William Lane Craig, has ever contended this.
Suppose then a divine command theorist responds to Islamic terrorism by affirming that God did not command any terrorist to blow themselves up. What is the problem? Harris seems to suggest this denial is a “faith-based claim” and cannot be known apart from faith. This, however, is extremely implausible. Is Harris really suggesting that we cannot know that a loving and just God does not command people to engage in terrorism apart from faith? Harris himself presumably thinks that God did not command Islamic terrorists to blow themselves up; has Harris based his conclusion on faith?
This point was made by Craig in the debate:
Harris: This is the kind of morality that you get out of divine command theory that, again, offers no retort to the Jihadist other than, “Sorry buster, you happen to have the wrong god.”
Craig: But that’s exactly your retort, Sam, that God has not issued such a command, and therefore, you’re not morally obligated to do it.
Harris: No, if God did, he would be evil. So I can get behind that God, if God is issuing that command, he’s an evil bastard.
This exchange is insightful as it shows the special pleading in Harris’ position. Harris objects that the only retort a divine command theorist can make to a jihadist is “you happen to have the wrong God” . Yet his own response to the jihadist is to state “the God you’re following is an evil bastard”; by this I take it Harrs means: the conception of God the Jihadist holds is one that is atrocious, a being that fitted that description would be unworthy of worship – but isn’t this just another way of saying the Jihadist is following the wrong God?
Contrary to Harris’s protestations, the answer he gives the Jihadist is actually the same as the one Craig suggests: God has not issued such a command. The only reason it appears to be a different answer is terminological. As I pointed out in my previous post, Craig, in this debate, is using the term “God” as a title given to any person who is “the greatest possible being”, who is “worthy of worship”. Hence, when Craig says that God has not issued such a command, what he means is that the command was not issued by a person worthy of worship, it was not issued by a person who was maximally great. Consequently, to point out that any person who issued a particular command is an “evil bastard” is, given Craig’s terminology, to point out it was not commanded by God. There is therefore no substantive difference between the reply Craig offers the Jihadist and that offered by Harris.
This raises an obvious problem for Harris. If the claim that God did not issue the command is merely a faith based claim then Harris’ own response must be a faith based claim, as it is the same response. Harris seems to think that the divine command theorist’s response is inadequate yet his own response is – but it is exactly the same response!
Harris’ comments show the divine command theorist can offer an adequate answer to Jihadists without reverting to mere “faith” claims. Harris’ comments show that when a person asserts that God has commanded some atrocity one can use normal moral reasoning to show that it is unlikely that God (understood as a person worthy of worship) commanded the action in question. Because we have some grasp of what justice and love are, we can tell that certain actions are likely to be commanded by a loving and just person and certain actions are not. Harris’ repeated polemic against Jihadism and the Taliban involves just that, he argues that these groups claims to be following God are false because any person who was not “an evil bastard” would not command the sorts of things those groups claim God commands. Hence, those actions were not commanded by a loving and just God who is worthy of worship. This attitude is no more psychopathic when expressed by Craig than it is when expressed by Harris.
Let me conclude by noting another odd feature of Harris’ criticisms here. In the citation above he offers the objection that: if a jihadist had the right God then what jihadists do would be good on Divine Command theory. What exactly is the problem here? Its true that if the theology of Osama Bin Laden is true then 9/11 was justified. Similarly if, what Hitler believed was true then exterminating Jews is permissible. If what Marxists claim is true then dictatorship of the proletariat is just. This is just the uncontroversial point that false ideologies often have false implications. It is unclear to me why Harris would want to deny this. Much of his polemic involves him arguing that certain religious beliefs are such, that if true, they have false or absurd implications. In fact, as I noted above, Harris states that he would reply to the Jihadist by stating “if God is issuing that command, he’s an evil bastard” which suggests that he believes if jihadism is true then evil things follow. Once again Harris seems to think that when a divine command theorist says the same thing he says it is absurd but when he says it it is really sensible. Unfortunately the truth of a proposition is not determined by whether Sam Harris utters it. It is determined by the facts.
Harris’ argument that a Divine Command Theory expresses a psychopathic moral attitude therefore fails. Of course Harris’ arguments resonate with a popular narrative of the secular west, that religion is the source of wars, division and violence, that it suppressed science ushering in the dark ages, inquisitions, witch hunts and freedom. Liberty and peace descended on Europe only due to the enlightenment advocacy of reason over faith. The problem is this narrative is false. Post 9/11 many people again feel the fear of religious violence and clinging to this narrative no doubt helps them make sense of these fears. Unfortunately bad history does not excuse bad arguments. Nor does it exonerate the blatant contradictions and special pleading in Harris’ arguments.
I look at Harris’ final remarks in Is a Divine Command Theory Psychotic? Sam Harris on Divine Commands Part III.